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2Overview
Reduced Crew Operations (RCO) would be 
more than “Flight Management on steroids”
An RCO system will
- have to be highly invasive into most, or all, 
existing safety-critical aircraft systems
- require a highly-reliable data communication 
system that offers very low latency and jitter, as 
well as high data integrity and authentication
3• Cockpit Crew (CC) vs Ground Crew (GC)
- CC is flying, GC is just standby redundancy
- CC is flying, GC is active second pilot
- GC is flying, CC is active second pilot (PNF)
- GC is flying, CC is just standby
- GC is flying, CC is an adversary or is suicidal
- CC is flying, GC is an adversary (spoofed)?!?!
Levels of autonomy and authority (CRM)
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4• Can RCO be used to assist (partially) 
able-bodied airborne crew?
• … totally incapacitated airborne crew?
- In the UK, there were 32 in 2009 and 36 in 2004
(~1 per 10 days)
• Can a GC via RCO be used to override a 
“rogue” cockpit crew?
Q’s and Preliminary A’s for Degree of Authority
5• Traditional 3 layers of aircraft control automation
- Flight Management System
- Auto Pilot
- Flight Control
Onboard Safety-Critical Systems
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7• An RCO system would need 
to be Byzantine fault tolerant
• Some/most actuators would 
have to be quad redundant
RCO Fault Tolerance
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9Don’t Re-invent the Wheel
• Not much R&D done for aircraft RCO safety/security
• Looked at R&D done in adjacent fields
- UASs (drones)
- Autonomous ground vehicles (shared control)
 “Right now, there’s no good answer, which is why we’re 
kind of avoiding that space”
-- Dr. Ken Washington
Ford VP
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Control Hand-Back Problems
• Paul Schutte:
- “computers […] give up at the first sign of trouble”
• Scenarios
- When at the controls, time to regain situational awareness
 Air Canada 878:  napping
 Audi
 Qantas Flight 32
- Time to get to the controls, when in cockpit
 Aeroflot 593:  kids at the controls
- Time to get to the controls, when out of cockpit
 Delta (Chautauqua) 6132:  captain stuck in the WC
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Typical Abnormality Requiring Crew to Leave Cockpit
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Are There Real Communication Threats?
• Individuals
- Officially called “phantom controllers”
 UK: 18 times in 1999
- Jim Epik’s book “Phantom Controller” and petition to encrypt ATC
• Groups
- 1981 PATCO
- Opposing factions in civil wars
• Nation-State sponsored
•Yes, we have to assume there will be
bad actors who are out to get us.
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Some Crypto Key-Management Issues
• Two aspects of key-management
- Trust
- Logistics
 Key distribution and management
• Distribution needs secrecy even if these keys
are used only for authentication, not secrecy!
• Invention to mitigate logistic issues for avionics
- No secrets stored on aircraft
- Simplifies the airborne side of link
• Issue:  Whose keys?
• (Inter)national cryptography laws 
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Cryptography Import Laws
• Red:
Total ban
• Yellow:
License required 
for importation
• Green:
No restriction
• Taken from:
en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Restrictions_
on_the_import_of
_cryptography
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Latency Problem?
Does the sum of all 
these added latencies
exceed the round-trip 
latency constraints?
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Problems with existing cryptography
when applied to cyber-physical systems
• Slow startup for each key change
• Use too much data memory
• Need more communication bandwidth
• Use separate secrecy and integrity algorithms 
or added integrity mode
• Many new cyber-physical cryptography 
installations will be retrofits, which further 
exacerbates the above problems
• These are the reasons we created an algorithm 
(called BeepBeep) specifically for real-time 
and/or retro-fit applications.
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Conclusions
• A high-capability RCO system:
– May introduce significant safety and security hazards
– Could be a “single point of failure” for the entire aircraft
• Technology not ready yet
– Research is needed into designing
multi-chapter “Level A+” systems
– Research is needed into the use cryptography for
low-latency and international applications
• RCO capability may be acceptable in the more 
near term for Part 135, cargo flights, and/or 
restricted routes and airfields
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